Paul G. Buchanan

Change of Guard Ceremony, Government House, Suva. Republic of Fiji Military Forces hand over guardship to Republic of Fiji Police. Photo: Republic of Fiji Military Forces (http://www.rfmf.mil.fj/news/Change%20of%20Guards.html) .

That has led observers to question the RFMF’s commitment to democracy, and led some to wonder if the elections will even be held as scheduled. As things stand a constituent assembly selected from a variety of stake-holding groups by current Prime Minister, Commodore Frank Baimimarama, will be convened in March 2013 with a charge to deliver the constitution for ratification by September. Once ratified, that constitution will be the foundational charter under which the September 2014 elections will be held.

There appears to be a consensus amongst foreign observers that the military objections to the draft charter are a sign of its reneging on its promise to restore democratic governance in 2014. Many see this as a sign of bad faith on the part of Commodore Baimimarama and the RFMF. In truth, this view may have neglected what the RFMF had in mind all along when it proposed the 2014 elections and hand-over date. What it had in mind was not a liberal democracy akin to those of its traditional patrons. Instead, what it envisioned, and which it has been pretty honest about when speaking of its vision of Fiji’s political future, is something that emerged in the 1980s and 1990s in Latin America, the Eastern Meditteranean and Southeast Asia: a “protected” or “guarded” democracy as a successor the the military-authoritarian regime. In spite of their socio-cultural and structural differences, post-military authoritarian Turkey, Brazil, Chile and South Korea represent good examples of the phenomena.

The concept is neither new or novel, and the learning curve derived from the precedent of larger countries is clear in the Fijian case. Fijian use of comparative referents is not unusual in any event.

Before detailing the specifics of “guarded” democratic regimes and the future of such in Fiji, it is worth reviewing some basic issues in constitution-drafting. Constitutions basically outline procedural and substantive guarantees. Procedural guarantees refers to the rules of the political “game:” who gets to vote, how they vote, how the votes are counted, who is eligible for office, how voting is apportioned, the duties and responsibilities of government and its respective agencies, the rights are people entitled to in and outside of the political process, etc. Substantive guarantees refer to the privileges accorded citizens: free speech, freedom of thought, association and movement, the right to cultural autonomy and identity, and often much more. Some constitutions are drafted along “minimalist” lines in that they refer mostly to procedural rather than substantive guarantees. Others are more ambitious, detailing substantive rights to education, health, housing, welfare, caloric intake, a role in governance and redress for past injustices. It goes without saying that the latter are harder to implement. In most instances constitutions are a blend of procedural and substantive guarantees, usually with an eye to providing the basic foundations for governance in which the rule of law can apply (and in which substantive guarantees can be negotiated).

Unlike limited democracies, in which the franchise and collective rights are circumscribed, in guarded democracies there are no limitations on individual or collective freedoms, including the right to vote. Nor is the military directly involved in politics. Instead, in a guarded democracy the military serves as an unelected overseer of the political system precisely because it sees itself as an apolitical, autonomous and professional commonweal organization not beholden to partisan interests. Military entrepreneurial activity (in the form of military and state-operated enterprises and public-private partnerships) and bureaucratic entrenchment (what Alain Rouquie called the “colonization” of the state by the armed forces) facilitate the military withdrawal from politics.

If the civilian government operates within the operational and policy parameters established by the military in the transition to electoral rule, then the military stays in the barracks and out of politics. It is only when civilian authorities are perceived by the military hierarchy to be overstepping their bounds (as defined by the military), that the armed forces as an institution intervene in the political process. This makes the military the power behind the throne and encourages self-limiting behavior on the part of civilian political elites.

Getting the opposition to agree to compete under the constitutional framework and electoral rules of the military regime, and to accept military oversight upon entering government, is a two-step “pact-making” process. Transitions from military-buraucratic regimes often involve implicit or explicit “pacts” between political elites. The first step in the pact-making sequence is agreement amongst opposition factions to compete under military tutelage. The second step is the reaching of agreement between the united (f not unified) political opposition and the military elite on accepting the rules in exchange for the outcome. The opposition agrees to compete under military-imposed conditions and the military agrees to accept the electoral result regardless of who wins. Under those “pacted” conditions the military relinquishes overt control of government while retaining guarantees of its institutional interests.

From its statements the Fijian military regime has been clear in what it expects of the new constitution. First, it expects that the concept of one adult citizen=one vote will apply. Second, it expects that all ethnic and sectoral preferences in politics will be eliminated. Third, it expects that public service autonomy and freedom from political interference will be enshrined in law (ostensibly as an anti-corruption measure but also as a means of ensuring the positions of the numerous military and ex-military appointees hired into the public service over the last six years). Fourth, it expects that the military will be allocated the role of “guardian” of the nation, including oversight and veto power over the policy decisions of elected civilian political authorities. The latter, which is a substantive guarantee to the RFMF, is designed as a check on the demagogic and populist instincts of civilian politicians. Coupled with the pro-military bias of the post-authoritarian public bureaucracy, this limits the effective power of civilian government when it comes to making policy or political choices inimical to the military vision of the “proper” role of civilian elected authority in the Fijian context.

Although there are many specific points of detail in its ideal version, the Baimimarama regime prefers a constitution with a broad procedural minimum and selective substantive guarantees that favor military institutional interests.

Leaked copy of Draft Fijian Constitution. Photo: Australian Network News (www.abc.net.au)

That is why the RFMF has rejected the draft constitution. Due to the tone of the rejection and the often personalized nature of the remarks of military spokespeople with regard to the reasons for the rejection, the regime will not request revisions from the international consitution-drafting committee. Instead, the regime will use offer its own revised constitutional template as the basis for the deliberations of the constituent assembly.  This includes elimination of provisions drafted by the Constitutional Committee that give civil society actors a formal place in political decision-making and agenda-setting, and insertion of military guarantees along the lines mentioned above. The March 2013 date for appointment of the constituent assembly will go ahead on schedule, as will the September 2013 delivery and ratification of the new constitution. Regardless of the concerns of foreign and domestic actors about the nature of the post-authoritarian regime, Commodore Baimimarama and his supporters have the dominant position in the lead-up to these milestones.

The regime’s position is strengthened because large parts of Fijian society support its views on constitutional reform, and it has the support of foreign states, China and Russia in particular, regardless of the final charter or the nature of the post-authoritarian regime. So long as that regime meets its (diplomatic, social and economic) contractual obligations to its supporters and foreign states, it will be seen as legitimate in the eyes of the majority of domestic and foreign actors.

This leaves the domestic opposition as well as foreign states that support a complete transition to elected civilian rule in a quandary. Some foreign actors such as Australia and New Zealand have financially supported the constitutional panel’s draft-making, and have tacitly admitted that the previous sanctions regime imposed on the military authoritarians by a group of Western states has failed.  The domestic opposition has been vocal about its opprobrium of Commodore Baimimarama and his colleagues, seeing no role for them, either individually or institutionally, in the post-authoritarian regime. Yet neither set of actors can play a dominant role in, much less set the terms of the negotiations that will determine the final constitutional draft submitted in September 2013.

In light of these factors, it would seem that the best option for “pro-democracy”  interests to regard the constitution-drafting process and subsequent elections leading to a “guarded” democracy as a step forward towards “genuine” democracy rather than as a reneging on a promise by the Baimimarama regime. Given realities on the ground, adoption of the latter posture will be counter-productive and further alienate the Fijian civil-military coalition from foreign and domestic interlocutors. Adoption of the former stance allows these interlocutors to stay in the game, metaphorically speaking, in order to pursue an incremental gains strategy in which the gradual evolution towards liberal democracy (which includes military subordination to civilian elected authority and institutions) is advanced. That may be a long-term game, but it could well be the only game with a chance of success if success is defined as the end of military guardianship of elected government.

Already, differences in approach are evident between key foreign states. Australia has responded with caution, agreeing with some of the Baimimarama regime’s objections to the draft charter. This appears indicative of an incremental gains approach to the issue of Fijian democratization. New Zealand and Samoa have responded more negatively, arguing that the rejection of the draft constitution is evidence of the military regime’s disinterest in real democratic promotion. The US and other external actors, to include China, India and Russia, have remained largely silent on the matter, which in diplomatic parlance equates to tacit acceptance of the regime’s position.

Foreign non-governmental organizations, including the international union movement, also take a negatively absolutist stance, decrying a dictatorial take-over of the constitution-drafting process. The trouble with the negatively absolutist view is that it offers no incentive structure for the Fijian regime to do anything other than its current course of action. Moreover, the disincentive structure that it favors, sanctions, suspensions and exclusion, simply have not and will not work. Thus those who advocate such a view, be they states or non-state actors, have no leverage in the process. That is why, even if by default or as a second-best option, the incremental gains strategy is the best option for those interested in seeing Fiji progress away from military-authoritarian rule.

Links:

Fijian Constitutional Committee

Party Rules

Constitutional Process Decree 2012

Draft 2013 Constitutional Appendages.

Citizens Constitutional Forum.

 Lowry Institute Assessment

Assessments by International Journal of Constitutional law and Constitution-Making (includes links to draft 2013 constitution and previous commentary).

David Beatson, “Fiji’s Dose of Khaki Democracy.”

Historical Antecedents.

Analysis – By Dr Paul G. Buchanan.

Fire boat response crews battle the blazing remnants of the off shore oil rig Deepwater Horizon. A Coast Guard MH-65C dolphin rescue helicopter and crew document the fire aboard the mobile offshore drill (Image sourced from http://de.wikipedia.org).

Introduction: One of the solutions to the problem of revenue generation in resource-poor states such as the small island countries of the South Pacific is found in the sale of tokens of sovereignty. Tokens of sovereignty are commodities derived from a state’s international legal status as a geographically and politically distinct, and hence sovereign entity. Unlike symbols of sovereignty such as national flags, tokens of sovereignty can only be sold, bartered or exchanged by nation-states. Be it postage stamps, internet domain addresses or passports, tokens of sovereignty command real value in both legitimate and black markets. In this assessment 36^th Parallel looks at the increasing use in the South Pacific of one such token: flags of convenience (FOCs).

It may come as a surprise to some that the BP Deepwater Horizon petroleum derrick in the Gulf of Mexico was classified as a vessel under international maritime law. Such platforms are classified as SOLAS (from the 1974 Convention on Safety of Life At Sea) vessels, in this case a non-passenger vessel of 500 tonnes or more engaged in an international voyage. There are currently 800 SOLAS vessels in operation. These vessels make nearly 6000 ports visits annually. In essence, under the SOLAS Convention and for the purposes of maritime law, the BP Deepwater Horizon and its ilk are considered to be floating barges that are towed to the exploration site and anchored before well drilling commences (the derrick is mostly assembled after anchoring).

For a vessel to operate in a commercial capacity it needs to be registered by a state, which determines the conditions and regulations governing the operation of said vessel. The BP Deepwater Horizon was registered in the Marshall Islands, a country consisting of two archipelagic island chains populated by 70,000 inhabitants that since 1986 is in a Free Compact Association with the United States. The Marshal Islands are where the Bikini and Enewetak nuclear tests were conducted and is home to the US missile tracking station on the Kwajalein atoll.

Ship owning companies seeking to reduce their tax burden and avoid strict regulatory environments in their countries of origin often “flag” their vessels in states with more permissive or business-friendly registration requirements. This gives them flexibility in the operation of their fleets in pursuit of higher profit margins. Such registrations are known as “flags of convenience” (FOCs). In many instances the registration can be done immediately on-line with the payment of a simple fee by credit card.

The cruise ship sector prefers tourist destinations such as the Bahamas or Bermuda to be the flag of choice. For example, Royal Caribbean International’s entire fleet is registered in the Bahamas. Norwegian Cruise Line has ten Bahamian-flagged ships and Carnival Cruise Lines and affiliates (owned by a US company) flags eleven ships in the Bahamas.  The Queen Elizabeth 2 and Queen Mary 2 are registered in Bermuda. The two countries are the flag of registry for approximately 70 percent of the world’s cruise ships. The Costa Concordia is registered in Italy. Malta and Greece are also favored cruise ship registries, and the Marshall Island serves as the FOC for the four-vessel fleet of the Pacific-based Oceania Cruises. Private luxury yachts aggregate under the flags of Monaco, the Virgin Islands, the Cayman Islands, Malta and the Turks and Caicos.

Aerial view released by the French Navy shows the Marshall Islands registered chemical tanker “ECE” northwest of the Channel Island of Guernsey, Tuesday, Jan. 31, 2006. Helicopters and life boats rescued 22 sailors after two ships collided Tuesday in the English Channel. The Maritime and Coast Guard Agency said the alarm was raised at about 2:20 a.m. (0220 GMT) following a collision between a chemical tanker and a cargo ship about 30 miles (50 kilometers) northwest of the Channel Island of Guernsey (Caption: Militaryphotos.net; Photo/French navy).

Working vessels tend to prefer flags of states not considered to be tourist destinations: Panama (the largest flag of convenience state), Liberia, Greece and increasingly, the Marshall Islands (Marshall Island registered vessels are the fastest growing flag of convenience). As opposed to “closed” or “national” registration states that require vessels to be owned by local companies subject to national laws, these are “open registration” states. Open registration is defined by most of the fleet being foreign owned and minimally taxed (registration fees provided the source of revenue for the registry state) while subject to a very loose regulatory framework with regards to wages, working conditions, vessel seaworthiness and environmental standard compliance, with regulatory enforcement and private risk insurance provided by the industries involved. The industries involved include energy exploration and transport, fisheries, bulk and refrigerated freight, but essentially run the gamut of what can put to sea.

Being landlocked is no impediment to FOC registration. Bolivia has 5 foreign owned vessels under its flag, and Mongolia has 44 foreign owned vessels registered.

The Marshall Islands has over 1500 vessels registered to its flag, making it the seventh largest merchant fleet in the world. Of these, over 1400 are foreign-owned. In an interesting arrangement with the US (from which it receives direct foreign aid amounting to 70 percent of GDP), all vessels flagged in the Marshall Islands can be requisitioned by the US in times of war (in exchange for US defense guarantee). At less than 100 vessels the US merchant marine fleet is dwarfed by that of the Marshall Islands, so the arrangement is prudent if not practical.  However, since US companies have 200 vessels registered under the Marshall Islands flag, it also demonstrates that patriotism is not a factor when it comes to commercial considerations with regard to flagging. The reality is that the US subsidizes a country that is in part responsible for the decline of the US merchant marine industry.

Although it is not alone in this, the Marshall Islands is remarkable for its lack of compliance, enforcement or inspection capability. As a micro-state is simply does not have the human or technological capital to effectively enforce common standards on its FOC fleet. That leaves the fleet essentially self-regulated, often on a vessel-by-vessel basis.

According to the CIA World Handbook, the Marshall Islands-flagged fleet consists of a total of 1,593 vessels, including the following types of vessel in its inventory: barge carrier 1, bulk carrier 524, cargo 65, carrier 1, chemical tanker 351, container 226, liquefied gas 88, passenger 7, passenger/cargo 1, petroleum tanker 297, refrigerated cargo 13, roll on/roll off 9, vehicle carrier 10.

The Marshall Islands is not the only Pacific Island Forum member to be classified as a Flag of Convenience (FOC) state. The Cooks Islands, Kiribati, Tuvalu and Vanuatu offer FOCs. Vanuatu has 77 ships in its fleet, of which 72 are foreign owned (39 by Japan). Tuvalu has 80 ships, of which 63 are foreign owned (Tuvalu has just de-registered under US pressure 22 Iranian oil tankers that were re-flagged in order to avoid international sanctions; it also has a past history of flagging North Korean vessels involved in arms and drug smuggling). Kiribati has 43 flagged vessels, 31 of them foreign owned.  The Cook Islands has over 50 FOC vessels. Tonga maintained an FOC fleet until 2002, when it halted its FOC registry after one of its flagged ships was found to be smuggling weapons from North Korea.

This highlights the problems of open registry. While many legitimate companies avail themselves of FOCs in order to reduce costs, increase their margins and decrease their liabilities, they are also the flag of choice for arms, drug and people smuggling as well as illegal fisheries. The problem is two-fold: In legitimate industries it allows for a “race to the bottom:” lowering of operational standards across the occupational strata (say, for example, in the inspection regimes of blue water fishing vessels or bulk chemical carriers). To this can be added corruption, whereby loose or nebulous regulatory standards imposed by FOCs are manipulated to the immediate benefit of those charged with enforcing rules and regulations. Worse yet, it facilitates criminal enterprise because of the incentive structures involved, and, as has been mentioned repeatedly in security circles, it makes real the possibility of seaborne unconventional acts of warfare.

Given these obvious flaws in an international regime that allows for state registration granting sovereignty without responsibility, one would assume that there are conventions and protocols to standardize registration and the awarding of flags across nations. The International Transport Workers Federation has lobbied to that effect for some time. But the reality is that there are no universal regulations or protocols governing seafaring registries. Nation-states can choose to be open or closed registry as they see fit. They can choose to model their registration requirements on those of other countries. The industries involved can and have developed their own regulatory standards and codes of conduct. But states or industries do not have an obligation to accept universal norms—their compliance with such is voluntary.  Here, sovereignty and self-interest trumps international regulation.

This has very serious implications for the South Pacific. The sale of tokens of sovereignty has been a lucrative source of revenue for Pacific micro-states. The proliferation of Pacific-based FOCs has the potential to surpass these as moneymakers (and indeed, is doing so in the Marshall islands). The real problem is that most of the fishing fleets and mineral, gas and petroleum exploration vessels/rigs operating in the South Pacific are registered under FOCs. This includes vessels working relatively close to shore as well as those operating on the high seas.

Loose regulations minimize legal and commercial risk over the short term. The chain of responsibility is long and compartmentalized so as to minimize the liability exposure of those vested in a FOC operation. Absent a uniform regulatory regime with real enforcement power, commercial interests seek to maximize immediate opportunities within the limits of their capabilities and self-imposed standards of conduct.  Data about accidents and other maritime mishaps, particularly on the high seas, suggests that a majority of the vessels involved are registered under FOCs.  That makes sense if for no other reason then the fact that FOCs comprise the majority of commercial vessels currently in operation.

Sierra Leon flagged fishing vessel working illegally in the Ross Sea (photo courtesy of Scoop).

As an example of the reach of FOCsin the South Pacific, consider recent oil exploration in and around New Zealand waters. The Petrobas petroleum survey vessel Orient Explorer, which has been granted a license to explore for oil deposits off of the Eastern Coast of New Zealand’s North Island, is registered in Panama, owned by a Russian firm, managed by a Singaporean company and currently operated by a Norwegian company that specializes in deep water oil exploration. Similarly, a specialist seismic acquisition vessel that operated off the southern New Zealand coast for four months in 2011-12, the Polarcus Alima, is registered in the Bahamas and operated by a company based in Dubai. One of its support vessels, the Jaya Amazon, is registered in Singapore. Because these latter ships operated inside the 12 mile territorial limit they were subject to New Zealand maritime, occupational health and safety and environmental regulations.

That is not the case with similar vessels operating outside the 12 mile limit but inside the 200 mile Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ). The same is true for most coastal states. Throughout the world but particularly in resource-rich waters, vessel operations are dominated by FOCs. The degree  to which they comply with national standards and regulations in territorial waters and EEZs is a function of the institutional capacity of states to enforce said regulations. In the South Pacific that capacity is often lacking.

The proliferation of FOCs in the South Pacific means that for all intents and purposes there is an unregulated seafaring environment in the region’s blue water. This not only includes fishing vessels and cargo carriers transiting through the South Pacific, but also the new wave of shallow and deep-water seabed mineral exploration floating vessels. The potential for accidents and a variety of illegal behavior at sea therefore rises commensurate with the number of FOC vessels in use.

One way to address the potential problems inherent in FOC seafaring is to use regional organizations to standardize registration criteria among member states. The South Pacific has the Pacific Island Forum and the South Pacific Commission as well as a number of specialized sub-groupings already in place, and these organizations undertake a number of region-wide initiatives that require standards and code of conduct within specified policy areas. However, there are currently no protocols or standards regarding FOCs in place in any South Pacific regional organization. Neither the Pacific Plan or the Millennium Target Goals adopted by the Pacific Island Forum address the subjects of FOCs. More basically, even if there were measures in place regarding the standards and conduct of South-Pacific-flagged vessels, the regional monitoring and enforcement capability is very weak.

The main obstacle to regional standardization of FOC registries in the South Pacific is the revenue generation that comes from the sale of tokens of sovereignty. Many Pacific Island Countries (PICs), especially micro-states such as Tuvalu, Nauru and the Marshall Islands, depend heavily on sovereign token sales for hard currency earnings. There is consequently a strong disincentive for them to agree to any move to standardize regulations governing the sale of sovereign tokens.

Even so, it is possible to distinguish between sovereign tokens with low negative impact, such as internet domain identifiers and stamps (what we can label as class B tokens), and those that have more serious negative impact such as passports and FOCs (as class A tokens). There are already strong international conventions governing passport issuance that attempt to curtail and mitigate document fraud. It is therefore possible that regional conventions can be enacted that would standardize FOC registry in ways that would similarly mitigate against the downside of the practice without completely removing national prerogatives with regard to FOC registration.

Alternatively, industrial groups operating vessels under FOCs in the region can develop industry-specific codes of conduct and registry requirements that uniformly raise standards without sacrificing individual competitive advantage for the firms involved.

Although it will not be on the agenda of the upcoming Pacific Island Forum meetings in Rarotonga, the subject of FOCs is one that could well be considered at future meetings.

Until then we should expect PICs to continue to offer FOC registration as a money making service, and we should not be surprised if a Pacific registered FOC vessel is involved in a significant maritime mishap in the years ahead.

This Week: Selwyn Manning interviews Nik Naidu on Fiji’s Slow Walk Back To Democracy – Beatson Interview, Triangle TV, August 6 2012.

Nothing is ever very predictable about the political situation in Fiji – except its unpredictability.

Early last week, foreign ministers from Fiji, Australia and New Zealand announced they’d agreed to restore diplomatic relations and exchange high commissioners.

By the week’s end, the Bainimarama administration had jailed the country’s last democratically elected leader for a year, and confirmed it was pressing ahead with charges against another former prime minister.

These developments all come on top of confirmation that the New Zealand security intelligence service has been involved in an investigation into an alleged plot to assassinate Fiji’s military leader.

Our first guest tonight was not involved in that investigation but he is tracking political developments in Fiji closely. Nik Naidu, is spokesperson for the Coalition for Democracy in Fiji – and he’s been talking to Selwyn Manning.

THE RE-ENGAGEMENT

Last week, New Zealand’s and Australia’s foreign ministers announced both countries would recommence diplomatic relations relevant to Fiji.

Q1: But are New Zealand and Australia relevant and important to Fiji’s interests?

Q2: Should Australia and New Zealand position to become relevant to Fiji’s broader interests, let’s say by lobbying the Commonwealth and EU to resume their financial and technical assistance to Fiji’s struggling sugar industry?

The Fiji sugar industry directly and indirectly employs an estimated 180,000 people.

Q3: What about the Pacific Islands Forum. Is it relevant to Fiji after almost six years of estrangement?

WHAT NEEDS TO BE DONE:

Q4: What is the rationale argued by the Coalition for Democracy in its submission to Fiji’s Constitution Review Committee?

Q5: How can Fiji move forward both from a security stability viewpoint and economically?

Q6: How can Fiji’s indigenous peoples and Indo-Fijians find a way to progressively co-exist culturally and politically?

Q7: How can Fiji’s new constitution exhaust the coup culture that has lingered on since the Rabuka Coup?

THE MILITARY RELEASING ITS HOLD ON POWER

Q8: Why would the Republic’s military willingly forego power over the people and become subservient to the will of executive government?

Last week former prime minister Laisenia Qarase was convicted of corruption and sentenced to one year’s jail. The Bainimarama military regime also announced it will press on with charges against former prime minister Mahendra Chaudhry.

It appears the military is removing any rocks in the road that would potentially pose a threat to a military dominated post election government.

Q9: Why should New Zealand transfer money and assistance over to Fiji now while the military continues on with these sort of tactics?

The Beatson Interview broadcasts weekly on Triangle TV and webcasts on LiveNews.co.nz.

Beatson Interview – Selwyn Manning IVs Matt Robson on foreign affairs, New Zealand’s independent brand, and the value of development aid.

Matt Robson is a former New Zealand Associate Minister of Foreign Affairs, and a minister responsible for NZAid in the first term Labour/Alliance Government. He has spoken extensively overseas on nuclear non-proliferation.

Questions Include:

Strength of New Zealand’s Argument:

Let’s look at the strength of New Zealand’s global brand from a foreign affairs point-of-view.

How has New Zealand’s foreign affairs wing been affected by the National-led Government’s cuts and restructuring plan?

In particular, how has this very public slouch between the Minister Murray McCully and our diplomats affected New Zealand’s ability to persuade other nations on issues of morality and peace?

Benefits of our Aid:

New Zealand’s aid budget has fallen to around half of what the Australian Federal Government has committed to (as a percentage of GDP) – Why this is so, and what advantages has this offered to Australia over New Zealand?

How important is New Zealand’s aid contribution? Is it tied to its international reputation?

How effective is aid as a mechanism of returning real value back to the donor country?

How relevant is New Zealand now among donor nations targeting the Pacific?

Should New Zealand embrace the Pacific region as its community and share its wealth within the Polynesia sector via targeted aid? If so, why?

And how can New Zealanders be assured that aid funds actually go toward targeted development projects?

New Zealand’s United Nations Security Council Bid:

When I interviewed Labour’s foreign affairs spokesperson Phil Goff on this program he said New Zealand would need to lift its aid offering as a percentage of its GDP if it is to gain respect among other nations, to be seen as a credible candidate for the UN Security Council bid.

What’s your take on this?

And do you feel New Zealand’s campaign to be appointed as a non-permanent member of the UN security council is a goal worth pursuing?

The Beatson Interview broadcasts weekly on Triangle TV and webcasts on LiveNews.co.nz.

Assessment/Analysis – By Dr Paul G. Buchanan.

Marines from 3rd Combat Engineer Battalion teamed up with soldiers from the New Zealand Army June 20, 2012 to conduct bilateral training. (Official USMC photos by Lance Cpl. Ali Azimi. )

On June 20 New Zealand Defense Minister Jonathan Coleman and US Secretary of Defense Leon Panetta signed the Washington Declaration, which specifies priority areas of cooperation between the militaries of both countries.The Washington Declaration is a follow up to the Wellington Declaration signed by New Zealand and the US in November 2010 (with Secretary of State Hillary Clinton and Foreign Minister Murray McCully doing the honors). The first was a general statement of principle with regard to New Zealand-US security cooperation and bilateral foreign relations. The follow up provides more detail on the specific areas in which military cooperation will occur. These are counter-terrorism, maritime patrol, anti-piracy operations and humanitarian relief. The details of the logistics involved in those areas have not been finalized and/or made public, and in the case of counter-terrorism operations they are not likely to be divulged beyond a general statement. This has as much to do with New Zealand public sensitivities as it does with US public opinion or classified operational details (for example, the role of the NZSAS in joint counter-terrorism operations with US forces).

What is different in the Washington Declaration is that the military-to-military bilateral relationship is now taking concrete shape, whereas the Wellington Declaration was a diplomatic opening rather than a definitive outlining of military areas in which joint operations and exercises will occur.

Professor Robert Ayson of Victoria University in Wellington described the relationship as a defacto alliance between the US and New Zealand. Professor Ayson used the phrase because the US and New Zealand are not entering a formal alliance agreement but a “strategic partnership.” An alliance is essentially a contract with mutual obligations; a partnership is a looser arrangement in which obligations are voluntarily assumed but not contractually defined, binding or specified. Partnerships can be reviewed and modified on a case by case or temporal basis, whereas alliances commit the parties to treaty-strength obligations that require a major diplomatic rupture for them to be abrogated. This distinction theoretically gives the US and New Zealand a greater degree of flexibility in their relations with each other on military issues. That is diplomatically advantageous for New Zealand , which seeks to preserve its image and reputation for foreign policy independence, and also avoids domestic voter backlash to the resumption of something akin to the ANZUS alliance so spectacularly undone by New Zealand’s 1985 non-nuclear announcement. The Labour, Green and Mana parties, in particular, would have been very resistant to the restoration of a formal military alliance with the US, so on political grounds the strategic partnership agreement works out very well domestically as well as bilaterally.

Patrolling through the Combat Center’s Range 220 Combined Arms Military Operations on Urban Terrain facility, the warriors of the two nations practiced urban patrolling, crowd control and other counter-insurgency principles. (Official USMC photos by Lance Cpl. Ali Azimi.)

In practice, the strategic partnership with the US aligns New Zealand with other “first tier” US security partners in the Western Pacific Rim such as Australia, Thailand, Singapore and the Philippines. This is important for the New Zealand Defense Force (NZDF) as it seeks to integrate more closely with Australian Defense Force operational doctrine, training and equipment (as was suggested by the NZDF 2010 Defense White Paper) at a time when Australia and the US are deepening their bilateral security ties (evident in the recently announced agreement to forward base a US Marine rapid response force in Darwin). Professor Ayson is essentially right in that the NZDF will now be working side by side with the US military on a regular and continuous basis in specified areas (such as the upcoming RIMPAC naval exercises that the Royal New Zealand Navy (RNZN) has joined for the first time in two decades), although NZ will have a little more leeway in refusing US requests to join in foreign conflicts than if it had signed a formal alliance agreement that required both parties to come to their respective defense.

The resumption of near-complete bilateral military ties between New Zealand and the US is not a surprise. The 5^th Labour government (1999-2008) started the rapprochement with the US post 9/11, and the National governments that followed it have openly embraced the prospect of finally overcoming the post-ANZUS freeze in security relations (with the exception of intelligence-sharing, which never suffered the curtailment of ties seen in military relations). Labour was wary of being seen as getting too close to the US, since that could jeopardize its reputation for an “independent and autonomous” foreign policy stance, particularly amongst non-aligned and small states. National prefers to embrace the US more whole-heartedly, in part because of the belief that there will eventually be economic as well as military benefits in doing so (such as via the Transpacific Partnership trade agreements currently being negotiated by the US, New Zealand and seven other Pacific Rim states). The idea behind National’s approach appears to be to use the improved military ties with the US as a hedge against the rise of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) by countering or balancing increased economic dependence on the PRC with the strengthening of economic and military ties with the US and other pro-Western nations along the Pacific periphery. National seems to believe that this balancing act (or straddling of fences), continues the tradition, or at least appearance of independence in foreign affairs.

That may be a mistake because independence in foreign affairs is most often predicated on neutrality with regards to foreign conflicts or great power rivalries. In aligning itself more closely with the US on military matters, New Zealand loses that appearance of neutrality in international security affairs. The New Zealand Foreign Affairs and Defense ministries may believe that this is the best hedge against attempts by the PRC to exploit its economic relationship with New Zealand (since the PRC is clearly the dominant partner in the bilateral Free Trade Agreement (FTA) with New Zealand and has much leverage on New Zealand when it comes to Chinese market access as well as exports and investment from the PRC to New Zealand). Balancing economic dependence on China with strengthened security ties with the US (and its allies) may appear to National to be the best way of New Zealand having its cake and eating it.

New Zealand Army soldiers search a Marine acting as an Afghan civilian as part of a counter insurgency exercise in the military operations on urban terrain town at Range 220 June 20, 2012. (Official U.S. Marine Corps photo by Lance Cpl. Ali Azimi.)

Strengthening of political ties with the US is part of National’s larger policy of reaffirming diplomatic alignment with traditional partners. The belief is that New Zealand shares more in terms of core values with these traditional partners due to the Anglo-Saxon liberal democratic traditions that bind them together, rather than the mixed Confucian-Communist-Nationalist values that underpin the core beliefs of the Chinese political elite (or the Islamic beliefs of New Zealand’s Middle Eastern trading partners). Even if the PRC was to continue growing economically at a pace similar to the last decade (which now seems improbable), it seems prudent under this logic for National to reaffirm its Western heritage, joint vision and general orientation until such a time as China and other non-Western authoritarian states begin to open up politically. Reaffirming political ties to the US and other traditional allies does not undermine New Zealand’s position with Asian democracies like India, South Korea, Taiwan or Japan, or with Southeast Asian democracies (such as they are) like Malaysia, Indonesia and the Philippines. All of these countries, as well as Southeast Asian authoritarian states such as Singapore and Viet Nam, fear the rise of China as a military power and/or economic hegemon in the Western Pacific, and therefore welcome any counter-balancing efforts on the part of the US and its strategic partners and military allies.  The political alignment with the US also fits in line with the foreign policy approaches of Australia and the UK, and reasserts New Zealand’s position within that informal alliance structure (Canada is part of it as well).

There are benefits for both the US and New Zealand in this restored relationship. The benefits for New Zealand are that the NZDF will get to conduct exercises and operations with the most hardened, experienced and technologically advanced military in the world. That will expose it to the latest in US strategic doctrine and tactics. It may also result in the US providing military equipment to and training opportunities for New Zealand that it otherwise could not afford. It will reassure New Zealand of the implicit US defense guarantee in the event that New Zealand were to be threatened or attacked (to include economic coercion by the likes of the PRC). It may lead to closer economic ties, although that remains an open and much debated question (there is a large literature on security partners being preferential economic partners because of the mutual trust and dependence established between them. Most of that literature was written during the Cold War and things changed after it ended, but now with the emergence of the PRC and other powers some of those old assumptions are being resurrected and reviewed, especially in the US).

For the US the agreement is win-win. It gets an immediate benefit from securing another strong security partner in the South Pacific, one that has considerable “local knowledge” and relative influence in South Polynesia. This accords with the shift in US strategic emphasis to the Asia-Pacific, which is part of a long-term strategy of ring-fencing Chinese attempts at blue water expansion into the region. In signing New Zealand to a bilateral military partnership similar to those of other Western Pacific states, the US has moved to establish a security cordon in the region, something that also serves as a force multiplier in the measure that US strategic partners commit military assets to a common cause. New Zealand’s reputation as an honest broker in international affairs gives it diplomatic cover in this effort.

More importantly, after 25 years of estrangement and New Zealand foreign policy independence, at least with regard to international security affairs, the US has finally broken down New Zealand’s resolve and returned it to the fold. Post 1985 wooing of New Zealand began during the Clinton administration and continued with his successors. 9/11 accelerated the reconciliation (under a Labour government), and the Wellington Declaration codified it. In many respects, the US’s ability to re-gain New Zealand’s signature on a bilateral military-security agreement is a triumph of long-term great power diplomacy: after years of distance it secured junior military partnership from a small democratic state that prides itself on its modern history of  foreign policy independence. To be sure, fluid global conditions since 1990 have contributed to the evolution in US-New Zealand bilateral relations, but at present it appears that the US has finally managed the contratemp of New Zealand non-nuclearism with diplomatic aplomb and to its ultimate benefit.

Secretary of Defense Leon Panetta and Minister of Defence Jonathan Coleman signed a partnership agreement the day before, pledging to work together to develop best practices in maritime security cooperation, humanitarian assistance and disaster relief and peacekeeping support missions. (Official USMC photos by Lance Cpl. Ali Azimi.)

The negatives for New Zealand could be that the US will pressure it to increase its spending on defense, now below 1 percent of GDP, to something more in line with Australia’s two percent per annum. This would be on a par with other US strategic partners and around the NATO average, but will be politically unpalatable amongst New Zealand voters, who tend to under-appreciate defense when compared with education, health and welfare. Thus any such request will be politically thorny for a New Zealand government. However, the US can leverage the fact that the NZDF is not “pulling its weight” in the strategic partnership (the Australians already say this).

For example, although the Washington Declaration speaks about closer bilateral military cooperation in the areas of maritime patrol and anti-piracy, New Zealand has very little in the way of long-range patrol and interdiction capabilities. Specifically, New Zealand only has two blue water ANZAC-class frigates, two off-shore patrol vessels and six long-range P-3 patrol aircraft, and its multi-purpose ship, the HMNZS Canterbury, spends more time in port being repaired than at sea, As for its logistical lift capability, not only is the HMNZS Canterbury unreliable, but the RNZAF C-130 fleet, at five aircraft, is also small and already stretched in terms of its operational readiness. Thus the US and Australia can pressure New Zealand governments to increase spending on defense so as to be able to perform the responsibilities and tasks that are expected of it as a strategic partner in the areas designated as joint priority.

There is the risk of being drawn into US conflicts that have nothing to do with New Zealand or an imminent threat to it. Even if New Zealand has leeway in terms of refusing a US request to get involved in a non-immediate foreign conflict, once bilateral military ties are established and consolidated they constitute a source of leverage on the part of the US since any retaliatory cancellation or disruption of the bilateral relationship will hurt the NZDF more than it will the US military. Moreover, the bilateral diplomatic backlash from a public refusal to work with the US in a foreign conflict theater could overcome any domestic and international support for the move.

There is also the more immediate issue of diplomatic fallout over the partnership. The more that New Zealand is seen as aligning itself with the US on security matters, the more US rivals such as Russia, the PRC, and various Latin American and Middle Eastern states will see it as a tool of US foreign policy and military strategy. Even other “independent” states like Uruguay, Finland, Costa Rica, Estonia and Turkey may begin to recast their view of New Zealand as a honest broker in international affairs. That is why National’s belief that its fence-straddling or hedging strategy will continue the image of independence may not work out to be the case, which could have adverse diplomatic consequences.

Analysis – By Dr Paul G. Buchanan.

Announcement that the European Union will direct  another 19 million Euros on top of the 785 million Euros (NZ$ 1.3 billion) already allocated to climate change adaptation in the Pacific serves as a good reference point for discussion about the use of foreign aid as an instrument of policy.

In general terms, the provision of aid can be considered to be a soft power means of winning friends and influencing people. Whatever the specific project or purpose, all aid can be considered to be “developmental” in the sense that it provides or facilitates the provision of something that local governments or communities cannot do on their own. These can be in the form of services such as professional expertise or health and education campaigns or in the form of concrete deliverables such as infrastructure improvements. They can involve institution and capability building, disaster relief, or humanitarian assistance which may involve the direct transfer of funds from governments, private agents or non-governmental organizations (NGOs) to local implementation agencies. They can involve soft or concessionary loans, direct grants and gifts, and the provision of labor. In all cases, the provision of foreign aid has as an immediate motive improving the relations between donors and hosts, although the background reasons for providing aid often differ and are not confined to promoting friendship between nations.

The literature on foreign aid is voluminous and often highly technical. It will not be reviewed here, nor will conventional categorizations in that literature be addressed. Instead, the object is to generally classify types of aid so as to understand their purpose and explore the consequences of their provision.

Developmental aid can be divided into three types: compensatory, idealistic and strategic.

Compensatory aid is provided in order to redress past collective injustice or exploitation on the part of the donor. In some cases it is a manifestation of post-colonial angst or idealism on the part of those saddled with the legacy of responsibility for unjust acts committed by their predecessors. In other cases it can be offered by private actors atoning for past exploitation. Although it can be offered for opportunistic, tactical or strategic purposes, it is seen as a form of restorative justice. An example is restoration of wetlands or shorelines by private developers, who belatedly understand that their private gain came at an ecological as well local community expense. Another example is the de-mining and medical services provided by states whose weapons are used in conflict zones.. They may not have been directly involved in the fighting, but they hold a sense of responsibility for the human toll exacted by it.

Compensatory aid should not be confused with reparations. Reparations are a monetary settlement between two parties, channeled as a financial transfer from one to the other in the form of direct grant or payment. Reparations are often involuntarily forced upon a defeated party to war, and are rarely given in peacetime. Compensatory aid is given unilaterally and is not part of a negotiated settlement between the donor and donee (although contracts exist with regard to the specific details of provision and implementation). Although it may involve the transfer of funds, the direction of funding and organizational channeling of compensatory aid is more conditioned and targeted than reparations usually are.

Idealistic aid is aid that is provided for altruistic purposes. It can respond to notions of universal justice or in defense of human rights as broadly outlined in the 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights and its addenda. It may have an ideological or philosophical basis, such as with classic liberalism or various religious beliefs.  Although state actors can adopt idealist positions on the provision of some form of aid, most of the aid provided for altruistic purposes is offered by private actors such as churches and non-governmental agencies like OXFAM and Surgeons without Frontiers. Even here, there can be strategic interests at play: churches may seek converts, NGOs may by pushing for the local adoption of universal codes of conduct, etc.

Strategic aid is aid that is offered in order to advance the geopolitical, private or public interests of the donor. It may have a compensatory or idealistic aspect to it. The differentiation with “pure” compensatory or idealistic aid comes from the primary motive behind its provision, which is not rooted in restorative  or idealist logics. Strategic aid is provided to advance the short and long-term interests of the donor, which may be calculated in terms of power, influence, cooperation or mutual gain. State, private sector actors and NGOs all engage in the provision of strategic aid.

The EU offer of aid to Pacific Island Countries (PICs) to help them “adapt” to climate change is an example of compensatory aid given with strategic purposes in mind. Stemming from the 2008 Joint EU-Pacific Islands Forum (PIF) Declaration and 2010 Joint Initiative with the PIF, the EU bases its latest initiative on the belief that climate change is the single greatest threat to PICs. The EU argues that although PICs contribute little to global warming, climate change and sea levels rises due to their relatively low amount of carbon emissions, they suffer disproportionately and immediately the effects of them. Thus the EU compensates for its negative contribution to climate change as a net carbon emitter via foreign aid projects specifically designed to ameliorate the impact of climate change on PICs. In doing so it strengthens EU influence  after a period in which it was largely absent as a regional player, thereby balancing or countervailing by non-military means  the initiatives of other countries and agencies also seeking to influence the region via economic and diplomatic initiatives. Although the reality may be that climate change is not the greatest threat to PIC welfare, at least over the short term, framing of aid provision in such terms gives it a humanitarian appeal that overshadows the broader strategic interests at play.

An example of strategic aid is provided by the PRCs funding of numerous infrastructure development projects in the PICs during the last 20 years. Run through a network of private and state agencies coordinated by the state capitalist policy directives of a single party authoritarian regime, China’s goodwill initiatives in the South Pacific may have idealistic motivations. They certainly has strategic value, as the promotion of strong diplomatic and economic ties throughout the South Pacific helps the PRC more directly monitor the sea lanes of communication that tie it to the commodity producers and consumers of Australasia and South America. The potentially dual purpose nature of many Chinese-funded and built infrastructure projects such as ports and airports has given rise to suggestions that it will eventually establish military bases in the region as part of an extended “String o Pearls” forward basing strategy. Whether that is true or not is open to debate, but the strategic utility of PRC aid to PICs is not.

The strategic utility of aid can be also seen in the history of USAID in the South Pacific after the Cold War. Once the Berlin Wall fell, the US withdrew most of its USAID offices and significantly downscaled its aid to the PICs. It even cut back on Peace Corps operations in the region (the Peace Corps being a volunteer organization that send US citizens to work on development projects in less-developed countries, with the money for their deployments coming from the federal government and administered through the State Department. In some parts of the world th Peace Corps has been accused on serving as an intelligence collection front for the US). Although Australia and New Zealand continued to supply aid to PICs, downscaling of US aid programs in the South Pacific created a developmental “vacuum” into which stepped the PRC, Taiwan, Japan and other actors willing to supply foreign aid for various developmental projects, often without the accountability rules that came with US, Australian and New Zealand aid. This shift in aid donors helped turn the foreign policy orientation of  several PICs, most notably Fiji, in an Asian direction.

Generally speaking, the rules governing the provision of compensatory aid are looser than those governing idealistic aid. That is because the former is a form of redress while the latter is focused on a specific developmental target. The accountability and implementation rules governing strategic aid are a mixed bag. In some case, such as with direct grants to local governments, the rules governing the use of aid donations are quite loose. In other cases, such as with programs that require financial transparency and organizational efficiency as defined by international actors (such as the nation-building efforts of the RAMSI mission in the Solomon Islands), the rules are quite elaborate (although, to be truthful, not always observed). This has led to the unhappy development of a two-tier system of aid provision in the South Pacific whereby efforts to demand more accountability and transparency on the part of some donors are undermined by the spendthrift practices of others.

Cultural practices also impinge on the provision of foreign aid in the South Pacific. Efforts to adapt foreign aid provision to local customary practice have often led to the misuse and misappropriation of funds. Pre-modern traditions of privilege, patronage and patrimonialism often clash with the transparency and accountability requirements of some donors. For example, the Secretary General of the Pacific Island Forum, Tuiloma Neroni Slade, recently thanked a visiting EU delegation in Auckland for their adoption of a “Pacific methodology” for implementation of the climate change adaptation project. The EU has referred to “tailor-made delivery methods” in which delegated cooperation would be considered on a case by case basis so as to reduce aid fragmentation in the region. Slade’s reference to a “Pacific methodology” may or may not be coincident with that objective, but it raises questions as to how local custom and EU implementation objectives will be reconciled in practice.

To this is added the problem of a growing aid bureaucracy throughout the region, much of it staffed by expatriates from donor nations and foreign agencies. With private and public sector backgrounds in “development” issues, aid bureaucrats often enjoy standards of living far superior to the local population and are therefore seen as removed from the actualities of policy implementation in the field.  Coupled with local aid bureaucracies in which customary practices of recruitment and distribution prevail, and the downside of foreign aid provision in the South Pacific becomes apparent. Whatever the intentions of the donors, in practice much aid does not achieve the intended developmental targets or goals. Much of that is due to waste and misadministration.

Regardless of the specific nature of the aid provided, provision of foreign aid in the South Pacific has deepened the aid dependence of PICs. In many PICs twenty percent or more of their GDP is made up of foreign aid, which in some cases has contributed to a condition of intractable dependence. Absent universal rules for aid provision negotiated by donors and recipients, to include standardized guidelines for aid provision and timelines for project completion and aid termination, this condition will continue in the future. For some donors that may not be a bad thing, as it provides them with an ongoing source of influence and leverage in local and regional affairs regardless of inefficiencies in aid provision.

Analysis – By Dr Paul G. Buchanan.

Samoa (also known as Western Samoa) celebrated 50 years of independence from New Zealand last month. Located between 13.35 degrees and 14.9 degrees South and 169.35 and 172.20 degrees West and consisting of nine islands, it is the oldest of the post-colonial Pacific Island states, although it remains under the New Zealand security umbrella (Samoa has no military) and is very dependent on aid and remittances from it (there are 131, 000 Samoans living in New Zealand). It is formally organized as a parliamentary democracy with a Westminister-style cabinet governing a unitary republic. It has a unicameral legislature (fono) of 49 seats, divided into 47 members representing 41 voting districts ( six two-seat and 35 single seat constituencies) selected from 31,000 local chiefs (matai, 16,000 of which reside in Samoa and where approximately eight percent are women) and 2 members selected from commoners. With a resident population of 190,000, that means that less than 19 percent of Samoans are eligible to run for 95 percent of national elected office (and only ten percent are physically present to do so), while the majority are underrepresented at less than five percent of foro seats.

The Samoan Parliament, Fale Fono.

Save for a brief interregnum in 1985, the Human Rights Protection Party (HRPP) has controlled government since 1982, and Prime Minister Tuilaepa Aiono Sailele Malielegaoi has held his position since 1998, after three elections (fono members serve five year terms). Should tradition hold true and the HRPP continue to control parliament, he will be succeeded by the Deputy Prime Minister, Fonotoe Nuafesili Pierre Lauofo. Although opposition coalitions have been able to obtain up to 15 seats in legislative elections (the minimum number of seats required to be officially recognized as a party in the fono is eight), no one opposition party has held more than 14 seats in the fono at any one time (after the March 2011 legislative elections and a subsequent by-elections the HRPP has 37 and the Tautua Samoa Party has 12). Samoa is therefore one-party dominant, which makes the executive-legislative fusing of roles, frequent minority party-jumping and chiefly dominance of fonomembership combine to exhibit a soft authoritarian trait: the tendency to use informal lines of authority as well as formal electoral mandates to dictate rather than legislate public policy. Add to that the strong HRPP presence in police and civilian bureaucratic leadership positions (there are 11 administrative districts in the country) and the use of government appointments as sources of patronage and private gain, and the soft authoritarian traits of the central government are accentuated.

The issue of corruption and abuse of authority is a very sensitive topic in Samoa. Emblematic in that regard is the ongoing crisis within the Samoan Rugby Union (SRU), whose national team management  has been accused by several national team players, including the former team captain, of misbehavior, corruption and fraud (Samoa is ranked tenth in the world, which is remarkable for a country of such small population size. Rugby has almost religious status and the national teams are a major source of hard currency income derived from international tournament appearances). The players were dropped from the national team and several SRU officials have been let go in in the wake of incidents during the 2011 Rugby World Cup in New Zealand, but the attitude of the SRU is considered to be symptomatic of a a more generalized sentiment on the part of Samoan elites. This has implications not only for Manu Samoa, but for the future of Samoan governance in general.

Two areas of civil society support for the Samoan political system as the Church and the German/Scot (and now Chinese) defended merchant class. There are several denominations of worship in Samoa, including Congregationalists, Roman Catholics, Mormons, Methodists, Seventh Day Adventists and the Assembly of God. Although they differ on particularities of religion and social order, as a  group they serve as defenders of tradition and social hierarchy. Many Church leaders are matai, and church politics are very influential in the conduct of the Samoan political system. This makes the Church as a collective entity as strong support base for the political system as given.

Descendants of the German colonialists who ruled (Western) Samoa from 1899-1914 after the 1899 Tripartite Convention divided the Samoan islands into German and US territory (the other party to the Convention, the United Kingdom, relinquished all claims to Samoan territory in exchange for Germany relinquishing its claims in Tonga) have a strong influence in the merchant classes. This influence is shared with merchants of Scottish descent and most recently, Chinese natives and their heirs. Their influence on the regime is considerable, and as the more sophisticated socio-economic class due to their exposure to international commerce and trade (even if they are heterogenous as a “class”), they are very influential on matters of foreign policy. As a result they are also a pillar of the Samoan political system, although their receptivity to reform is considered to be greater than that of the Church hierarchy.

The central administrative apparatus is overlapped on the matai system, selection to which is determined by inheritance, kinship and clanship ties (often rooted in economic interest) rather than open contested elections. The judiciary is populated, and most local police and civil administrative decisions are made by matai. Given the limited capacity exercised by the Samoan state in remote areas of the archipelago, this makes for a de facto decentralization of authority that provides a check, if not a balance on the powers of the central government. Even so, chiefly ties permeate and inter-connect the matai system and central government, culminating in the composition of the foro.  Although there has been universal suffrage over the age of 21 since 1990 (voters must be registered with a village in order to vote for matais in the general election while non-village affiliated voters elect two country-wide non-matai seats), there are many aspects of the local and national political process that are more opaque than transparent. This gives a strongly elitist  as well as conservative nature to Samoan politics.

In light of the criteria for political selection at all governance levels and the selectively representative nature of the central government, the Samoan regime can be properly construed as a patrimonial democracy or hybrid regime that combines democratic and non-democratic features. It also is worth noting that with nearly the same number of Samoans living abroad as there are resident in-country (150,000, mostly distributed in American Samoa, New Zealand, Australia and the US), the role of remittances (which amount to 24 percent of GDP) and political influence of the expatriate community (including 15,000 matai) is particularly significant in Samoan government practice.

Comparatively speaking, Samoa represents a middle ground in regional politics. Where Fiji has regressed politically in the last decade (moving from a fragile democracy to a military-bureaucratic authoritarian regime) and Tonga has progressed along a path of political liberalization initiated by the late King Tupou V, Samoa can be seen as stable but stagnant. Continuation of nobility-based politics under an electoral umbrella has allowed for government continuity in a measure not seen in Melanesia and on a par with Tonga and some smaller Polynesian states, but it also has prevented effective re-generation of the Samoan political elite. Much of the Samoan intelligensia lives abroad and/or is disinterested in political life, so the long-term viability of the Samoan regime, however it is defined, remains open to question. Short term stability is strong, but medium and long-term stability are less certain. One of the measures of future stability is the economy.

Since the day of independence Samoa has moved from a primarily subsistence agriculture and artesian fishery-based economy to a mixed productive base that includes tourism, other services and limited industry as significant components. Tourism and other services account for over seventy percent of the national GDP (at US$1.1. billion), while industry makes up 13 percent and primary good production (agriculture, fisheries and forestry) 12 percent. Australia is Samoa’s largest trading partner (in terms of imports), and export markets in Asia and Europe have begun to replace the Antipodean markets that have been major export destinations since before independence. Traditional subsistence practices remain a major part of the national economy, albeit informally, and a large portion of the able-bodied workforce are not employed in value-added or scaled economic activity that is linked to larger productive chains. In fact, only 18 percent of the workforce is formally employed, with nearly sixty percent engaged in subsistence agriculture. Hence, as a country with a very small and unsophisticated internal market located in a geographically remote area with a limited resource base, dependence on imported fuel and lacking skilled labor, Samoa’s developmental possibilities are constrained. As a result foreign direct investment remains very modest in global terms (less than US$10 million in 2011 after a high of US$45 million in 2008), and constitutes less than two percent of Samoa’s GDP. As such it retains its Least Developed Country status under international conventions until 2014 (a status that Samoa lobbied to have extended rather than accept the guidelines governing the Developing Country category in international protocols).

Most excess Samoan labor moves overseas and contributes to the national economy via remittances. The impact of emigration is strong, with a national population growth rate of less than 0.5 percent in spite of a relatively high birth rate. Tourism (now the major economic sector), remittances, foreign aid and loans constitute the main sources of hard currency earnings in the country and compromise the majority of GDP. Bi-lateral and multilateral foreign aid amounts to approximately US$110 million per year (or about 11-12 percent of GDP), with 30 percent of that coming from Australia (New Zealand is Samoa’s second largest aid donor and China, the US and the European Union also contribute significantly). This gives the economy the classic features of intractable dependency (outlined in the a previous assessment here). Because of the sizable expatriate community, Samoa is one of the highest recipients of remittances as percentage of GDP (yet at 25 percent of GDP is lower than in Tonga at 42 percent). This expatriate community also is the source for thirty precent of tourist visits, so its economic impact is magnified. In contrast to other economies in the region that show signs of intractable dependence, Samoa has not experienced significant capital flight and has enjoyed low inflation and comparatively good growth rates over the least decade in spite of the global recession and a series of natural disasters that impacted heavily on the tourism sector and reduced exports. Forecasts remain positive for modest (1-2 percent/year) growth in the years ahead.

Although it continues to run very large trade deficits due to its limited export base, Samoa has worked to diversify its trade and investment relationships, moving away from its traditional focus on New Zealand, Australia and the US and towards Asia. A Japanese firm, Yazaki Samoa, manufactures automobile components for export and employs around 1000 people depending on market demand. A brewery (which has elected some social protests) and the banking sector also have been the object of foreign investment interest. Asian investors have started to expand the fisheries and forestry industries and the majority of infrastructure development projects are financed by Asian (most often Chinese) capital. Buildings housing central government offices and the Justice Ministry,  as well as a national sports stadium were built by Chinese interests and financed by concessionary loans from the PRC that essentially amounted to goodwill gifts, and a national hospital and conference center currently under construction are similarly financed (and physically built) by the Chinese. A long-established Samoan Chinese community has facilitated cultural and diplomatic links with new Chinese economic partners and the PRC government.

Samoan Government Office Building.

One curious aspect of Samoa’s relationship with the People’s Republic of China is the very large amount of foreign direct investment originating in Samoa that goes into China. This apparent anomaly is explained by the phenomenon known as “round-tripping,” where investors confronted with restrictions and higher tax rates on direct investment in China use tax havens and countries with loose financial regulations to redirect capital through them as the source of FDI, thereby circumventing the constraints on and compliance costs of direct investment. This led to the absurdity of having Western Samoa listed as the source of origin for two percent of the FDI in China in 2004, exceeding that of several European and Latin American countries (involving several billion US dollars worth). In recent years, under international pressure to tighten its finance regulatory framework, Samoa has adopted reforms that have discouraged such practices, although money laundering and other “grey” financial transactions involving off-shore agents are believed to continue. This continues to cloud the real value of FDI to the Samoan economy and lowers its ranking on international anti-corruption and transparency indexes.

The approximation with Asia has altered Samoan foreign policy. It has been characterized as conservative and pro-Western in the past, and many aspects of that characterization remain true today. Yet over the last decade Samoa has followed its new trade and investment links with a more independent foreign policy orientation based on the cultivation of diplomatic ties with Asian countries. This follows the more general re-orientation of the “Looking North” policy that is subscribed to by most independent Pacific Island Countries, including Tonga and Melanesian states. Samoa has the advantage of a long-established and well-integrated Chinese community, which has made the incorporation of Chinese economic interests easier than in other countries where resistance to Chinese influence is stronger.

Samoa has the characteristics of a dual society, with a small urban and globalized elite and middle class (with a strong ethnic Chinese presence) and a large rural, non-urbane peasant and small farming class. Tourism enclaves have accentuated the urban-rural divide in some remote areas, and urban matai account for the bulk of the “sophisticated” classes. Although cultural traditions remain strong and non-commodified relationships are highly valued, the impact of foreign influences (both direct and as channeled by the expatriate communities) has eroded some aspects of traditional social hierarchies, something that increases along generational lines (see, for example, the influence of expatriate Samoan “rappers” on indigenous youth culture). This has been compounded by exposure to foreign tourists and aid and development programs, particularly those of Western states that put a premium on “good governance” based on notions of transparency and due process. Taken together, technological and the impact of other human environmental changes make for a society in gradual transition from tradition to modernity.

The darker side of globalization has affected Samoa not only in the form of the  ”round-tripping” phenomena and related instances of non-trasparent financial practices, but also in the form of new criminal activity, particularly the trans-shipment and manufacture of narcotics and their precursor chemical components. Issues of lax border and financial controls and significant public sector corruption have facilitated the emergence of new and more sophisticated non-indigenous criminal syndicates, although overall incidences of drug use and trafficking remain low in comparison to Australia and New Zealand (the preferred destination for narcotics and narcotic precursors originating in Asia). Law enforcement officials also are concerned about the possibility that Samoans engaged in organized crime in the US, Australia and New Zealand will use their cultural ties to exploit Samoa’s security weaknesses in order to network with Asian crime syndicates for mutual gain (the Samoan Transnational Crime Unit consists of a sergeant and three uniformed officers). Otherwise and in spite of changing social mores and isolated instances of violence associated with criminal enterprise (including a recent death connected to a shoot-out between Samoan Police and drug traffickers), crime rates remain low in Samoa, and violent crime other than domestic violence  is very low in comparison to other areas of the South Pacific.

36th Parallel Assessments – Analysis By Dr Paul G. Buchanan

Introduction:On May 24, 2012the foreign ministers of the United States of America and New Zealand met for bilateral meetings after the conclusion of the NATO Summit in Chicago. Afghanistan, Syria and Myanmar were topics of discussion, but the real news was the US’s tacit endorsement of New Zealand’s bid for a non-permanent seat on the UN Security Council (UNSC) in 2015-16.New Zealand has consistently lobbied for the seat in recent years, but it was not until Secretary of State Hillary Clinton said (at the stand up press conference with New Zealand Foreign Minister Murray McCully) that she “admired” New Zealand’s campaign for the seat that New Zealand’s efforts appear to be rewarded.

Prior to this latest bid, New Zealand has held a non-permanent seat in the UNSC three times. The last time New Zealand held such a seat was in 1993-94, so New Zealand diplomats feel that the country is overdue for another stint. In its bid New Zealand is opposing Spain and Turkey (only one country from various diplomatic blocs is selected in each voting round, with 2015-16 seats voted on in 2014), so even with the US endorsement the odds of it gaining the seat are even at best.

The US endorsement of New Zealand’s bid, as well as the timing of it, may turn out to be a double-edged sword. This has to do with New Zealand’s shifting foreign policy orientation and Australian aspirations for a non-permanent UNSC seat in 2013-14 (which will be voted on later this year, and in which Finland and Luxembourg are the other candidates). That means that the two major Anglophone powers in the Southwestern Pacific are vying for non-permanent seats on the UNSC in consecutive years. That might be a hard sell.

US endorsement of New Zealand’s UNSC bid comes on the heels of a warming of relations between the two countries under the National government led by Prime Minister john Key. Relations between New Zealand and the US thawed under the previous Labour government of Helen Clark after years of distance caused by New Zealand’s adoption of a non-nuclear stance in 1985. Even so, under the fifth Labour government  New Zealand still clung to its “independent and autonomous” foreign policy, one that emphasized multilateralism, support for the UN and a specialist focus on non-proliferation and human rights issues. Under National that position has been modified to one that prioritizes bilateral relations with the US and Australia and which attempts to straddle the fence between East and West by emphasizing trade relations with Asia and the Middle East while reaffirming defense and security ties with Australia and the US as part of the “Pacific Century” approach adopted by the latter. Evidence of this new approach is seen in the 2010 New Zealand Defence White paper that recommends closer integration with Australian defence forces and the signing of the 2010 Wellington Declaration between the US and New Zealand that re-establishes a full range of bi-lateral military and security relations (to include full intelligence sharing and the resumption of bilateral military exercises). Most visibly, National returned the New Zealand Special Air Services (NZSAS1) to Afghanistan after the previous Labour government withdrew them citing problems with corruption and prisoner abuse, a move that was repeatedly lauded by the US as a major contribution to the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) mission in that country.

These tightened security relationships occur in parallel with New Zealand’s signing of trade agreements with the People’s Republic of China, its membership in the P-4 (Brunei, Chile, New Zealand, Singapore) trading bloc, now serving as the base for the negotiation of the Trans-Pacific partnership agreements involving several Pacific states including Australia and the US, and its negotiation of both general and specific trade agreements with India, Russia and several Middle Eastern countries (including Iran). This two-track approach in which security and trade relations are increasingly diverged rather than converged runs counter to the traditional relationship between security and trade (where security partners tend to be preferential trading partners and vice versa), and demonstrates New Zealand’s interest in pursuing an increasingly Asian-centric trade focus while retaining the security guarantees that come with closer military and intelligence-sharing relations with Australia and the US.

That raises some interesting questions regarding the way in which New Zealand has gone about lobbying for the UNSC seat. China and Russia are both permanent members of the UNSC and undoubtably (albeit quietly) have a say in who occupies non-permanent seats. They are also US rivals. In addition, they are members of the BRIC bloc of rising powers that includes India and Brazil, both of which are seeking permanent seats on the UNSC. It is therefore a matter of conjecture as to whether New Zealand approached any of the BRICs for support in its quest for a non-permanent UNSC seat. If so, public US endorsement of the bid could undermine the support of the BRICs, without which the New Zealand effort is doomed to fail. If not, then its diplomatic skills are clearly wanting and reflect a diminishing understanding of the importance of what can be called “blocmanship:” the ability to navigate and secure the support of different diplomatic blocs within the UN and international community at large.

New Zealand’s Brand Within The UN.

Within the UN, New Zealand is already identified with the so-called CANZ bloc (Canada, Australia, New Zealand) and along with Australia is a member of the Western European and Others Group (WEOG). It is consequently seen as an integral member of the “traditional Western” powers bloc. It is not a member of the 42-member small island state alliance (AOSIS) or the Asia Pacific Group (both of which include many Pacific Island Countries (PICs)), nor is it a member of the non-aligned movement (NAM). This means that even though it is an Oceanic state by geographic definition, it is seen within the UN as traditionally Western in orientation, and therefore responsive to the dictates of larger Western powers. That may have been true during the Cold War, at least until 1985, but for the two decades ending in 2008 New Zealand worked hard to establish itself as an independent Pacific State working within the confines of CANZ and the WEOG to provide a voice for small states in general and its smaller Pacific brethren in particular (say, for example, on the impact of climate change on rising sea levels). With National’s shift in foreign policy that era ended, which makes New Zealand’s Oceanic credentials in the eyes of many less credible today than ten years ago.

Thus it would seem imperative for New Zealand to shore up support with important UN voting blocs beyond WEOG before it submits its bid, and in receiving the US endorsement it may well alienate some potential supporters because of their specific conflicts with the US or opposition to US and European domination of the UN in principle. This includes the Pacific Island Forum, South Pacific Conference and Melanesian Spearhead Group, which if not voting blocs within the UN certainly wield influence on their member states within AOSIS, the Asia-Pacific Group and the Small Island Developing States (SIDS) group when these engage in UN voting.

The Helen Clark Factor.

An interesting sidebar to New Zealand’s diplomatic efforts in the UN (or lack thereof) is the presence of former Prime Minister Helen Clark as the head of the UN Development Program. The position is the second most important in the UN and many observers have picked Clark as an eventual UN Secretary General. It could be assumed that Ms. Clark would support the New Zealand bid in principle, although it is possible that the re-orientation of New Zealand foreign policy after her departure from the Prime Minister’s office has made her less enthusiastic about its current role in the international community. Given her power and influence, it may be the case that if she is supportive of the bid, that will translate into votes in favor of New Zealand from countries with which the UNDP works closely, including Oceanic states. But if she decides that there might be an appearance of conflict of interest in her voicing support for the New Zealand bid, than she would likely choose to remain on the periphery of the negotiations leading up to the vote. If her primary concern is about her chances for future appointment as UN Secretary General, then whether or not she is genuinely supportive of the New Zealand bid will likely take a  back seat to calculations about the balance of votes in 2012 and beyond (Secretary General Ban-Ki moon’s current term expires in December 2012). Add in the fact that Secretary General appointments must have the approval of the five permanent UNSC members (all of whom have a veto), and Ms. Clark’s calculations may indicate that a more agnostic position on her part with regard to the New Zealand bid is the most prudent course of action, at least until (or if) New Zealand returns to its independent and autonomous foreign policy orientation.

Australia and New Zealand’s UNSC Bids Problematic.

The timing of New Zealand’s bid is also problematic. Australia is lobbying hard for a non-permanent seat on the 2013-14 UNSC, and follow-up selection of New Zealand might be seen by some countries as a case of too much Antipodean presence in too short a period of time. This is especially true because New Zealand’s foreign policy shift under National now squarely aligns it with Australia on security matters, which in turn has become the US’s foremost ally in the Southern Hemisphere and is rapidly on the way to becoming the US’s most important security partner in the 21st century now that the UK is in relative decline (at least when it comes to projecting and sustaining force deployments abroad). Countries that would otherwise vote for New Zealand as an independent Oceanic, small country representative (even if a member of the WEOG bloc) now must take into account the fact that it is no longer acting in the independent fashion that it once did, and that it in fact has aligned itself quite closely with Australian and US interests in the South Pacific and beyond. This may not sit well not only with the BRICs or other Latin American, African or Asian countries disinclined to toe the US line on international affairs. It also may not secure the support of important Oceania countries such as Fiji, which is the subject of official travel sanctions on the part of New Zealand, Australia and the US as a result of the 2006 military coup and which may not wish to see such a strong Antipodean influence within WEOG and the UNSC (Fiji has recently joined Vanuatu as the second PIC member of the Non-Aligned Movement and has cultivated closer diplomatic, economic and military ties with China (and to a lesser extent Russia) under its “Looking North” policy, thereby signaling a shift away from its traditional orientation towards the WEOG in international fora).

In addition, the back-to-back sequencing of the Australian and New Zealand UNSC non-permanent member bids suggests a lack of diplomatic coordination between the two countries. It should be obvious to Canberra and Wellington that, for the reasons outlined above, such a sequence would be problematic at best and could undermine both bids with the result being that at least one of them ends up unsuccessful. It is therefore an open questions to whether the Antipodean neighbors consulted on the timing and sequence of the bids and if so, what rationale caused  each of them to continue with their campaigns in spite of the obvious diplomatic conundrum created by their doing so.

Although Australia has relatively small opponents in its quest for the 2013-14 WEOG non-permanent UNSC seat, both Finland and Luxembourg have reputations for relative independence in foreign affairs and have lobbied hard for selection. Thus, even though there are two seats open in the 2013-14 selection round, Australia’s chances of securing the seat are by no means assured even if it has US support, because if nothing else Finland and Luxembourg are seen as less likely to slavishly follow the US lead in UNSC voting. For New Zealand the problem is the same but worse. As a member of WEOG it is now is seen as one of the more US-supportive members of that bloc, but without the strategic importance and diplomatic weight of the Australians. It also is competing with Spain and Turkey for the 2015-16 WEOG non-permanent UNSC seat. Although Spain’s reputation has been diminished by its ongoing  economic troubles, Turkey is a regional power on the rise, a bridge between the Islamic and Western worlds, and an example of an Islamic state successfully mediating between national religious and secular interests (to say nothing of an important interlocutor in Middle Eastern conflicts). It is consequently a formidable candidate for the 2015-16 non-permanent UNSC seat, especially because it has exhibited an increasing degree of independence from US and European diplomacy at a time when these are being called into question in other parts of the world.

Why Has NZ Deployed An Open Quest For US Support.

The question therefore remains as to why the timing of the New Zealand bid and why the open quest for US support? Mrs. Clinton’s remarks at the press conference that followed her meetings with Mr. McCully were remarkable for their indelicate tone. In proclaiming admiration for the way New Zealand “ran its campaign” the Secretary of State implied that the US position was a reward for New Zealand’s change in foreign policy stance and its support for US endeavors in places like Afghanistan. This makes it appear as if New Zealand has been obsequious in its attempts to curry favor with the US, which would not matter except for the small issue of its previous reputation as an independent player and honest broker in international affairs. Add to that the Australian bid  for a non-permanent UNSC seat in the year immediately preceding New Zealand’s and the possibility of a successful campaign becomes more problematic. Even if Australia fails in its bid, New Zealand’s close association with Australian and US interests may turn out to be counter-productive in light of the other candidacies involved and the lukewarm reception to its overtly pro-US orientation on the part of important states such as those encompassed in the BRICs.

New Zealand may believe that its expanding network of non-Western trade partners allows it to ameliorate concerns about its pro-US orientation and demonstrates that it can bridge the divide between contending great powers as part of a strategic balancing act that continues to show overall independence in foreign affairs. That may be true, but the bottom line is that the UNSC is a security-focused international body, not a trading bloc. That means that it deals specifically with critical and contentious security issues such as the civil uprisings in Libya and Syria. The pressures placed on non-permanent UNSC members at such times are great and often contradictory, and involve a mix of incentives and disincentives of a pubic and private nature offered by the permanent members in pursuit of their often contrary agendas with regard to any specific issue. In that light, New Zealand’s attempts to straddle the fence in its security and trade relations could prove detrimental should it be successful in securing a non-permanent UNSC seat given the balance of power amongst the permanent UNSC members. In other words, its overt pro-US security orientation within the UNSC could elicit contrary responses on the trade front if the US position is opposed by the likes of China and Russia. If it opposes US resolutions or fails to fall in line with US voting preferences in the UNSC it may find itself once again subject to a cooling of relations with its most important security patron. Thus, New Zealand could lose even by winning the campaign for the 2015-16 UNSC non-permanent seat, something that should be factored in along with the other issues mentioned when the final stages of the campaign begin in earnest next year.

36th Parallel Assessment Series – By Paul G. Buchanan

Introduction:

Four of the South Pacific militaries are variations of the traditional professional model: Australia, Chile, France and New Zealand. In each country the military as an organization is subordinate to elected civilian authority and primarily has an external focus. The Australian and French armed forces are examples of expeditionary forces, those that are organized and trained to fight overseas. That includes a logistics and supply capability that permits ongoing off-shore combat operations. In Australia’s case it has become a major ally of the US and serves, to a great degree, as the “deputy sheriff” of the US in the Southwestern Pacific and Indian Ocean Areas of Responsibility (AORs). Its strategic outlook dovetails with that of the US accordingly. France home ports its Pacific Fleet in Papeete, French Polynesia and has sizable land-based garrisons there and in New Caledonia. Although these garrisons are designed to reinforce French sovereignty over its territorial possessions and thus have internal security functions within them, they constitute overseas deployments for the soldiers involved and are combat-ready (local and mainlander gendarmes do domestic policing). French military forces in the South Pacific are not as integrated into US strategic planning as are Australian forces, but nevertheless exercise and share intelligence with their Antipodean and US counterparts.

The New Zealand Defence Forces are by far the smallest of the traditional professional militaries in the South Pacific, and are characterized by an overt orientation towards international peace-keeping. They do not have a combat air force and have limited naval power projection capability. Although it has a well-respected elite Special Air Services unit that has served in a number of conflict zones including Afghanistan and (reportedly) Iraq, the Army spends as much time on its combat engineer and medicine deployments as it does on combat operations.  This is in line with New Zealand’s long-standing peace-keeping orientation, which has seen its forces recently serve in places as disparate as Bosnia, Lebanon, the Sinai, Solomon Islands and East Timor. Like the other three traditional militaries in the region, the NZDF prides itself on its professional integrity and autonomy from partisan politics.

Australian and New Zealand military and police provide security coverage for all of the Pacific Island countries other than Fiji, Papua New Guinea and Tonga that are not covered by the US or France. These include Manu Samoa, Nauru, Kiribati, Niue, the Cook Islands, and the Solomons.

Fiji is the largest and longest-established of the Pacific Island Country (PIC) militaries. It has a long and distinguished record of international peace-keeping service, and has sent its troops into battle (and lost many) alongside other British Commonwealth nations, where they have distinguished themselves with their bravery and warrior spirit. However, although it has given the appearance of a new professional military from time to time (that is, one that divides internal and external security functions more or less equally and which is largely independent of civilian oversight), in the last 15 years the Republic of Fiji Military Forces (RFMF, known as Fiji Military Forces) have reverted to first an arbitrator and now a ruler praetorian role.

After an initial suspension in 2007, the RFMF has been restored to UN peace-keeping contributor status, with Fijian military observers currently stationed in Lebanon and Syria. However, it is barred from participating in Commonwealth and Pacific Island Forum-mandated multi-lateral military operations (in the latter case, such as the RAMSI mission in the Solomon Islands), and was not invited to join the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan even though another PIC military, that of Tonga, joined the coalition. Fijian officers and officer candidates are barred from Commonwealth and US military training and exercises, so have increasingly turned to the People’s Republic of China (PRC) for military training and education exchanges and, in a limited way, operational exercises. Because military service has traditionally been seen as an avenue for upward mobility and a major source of hard currency income for lower class families (since international service entailed payment in US dollar or Euro rates), the prohibitions on international peace-keeping was a major source of concern for the Baimimarama regime. It has solved the problem by allowing RFMF personnel to serve in foreign militaries such as that of the UK or with private security companies (PMCs) in conflict zones. In addition, the Fijian Defense Ministry and RFMF are involved in a private-public security partnership in the form of Fiji Defence Logistics (FDL), which offers logistical and operational support to private and public agencies abroad. These three vehicles of military labor absorption had had the dual effect of guaranteeing hard currency remittances (which are a third of the GDP) while providing career opportunities for officers and soldiers otherwise sitting idle in barracks at home (since even very generous bureaucratic placement of military personnel cannot absorb all of the excess capacity and requires a different skill set than that possessed by most RFMF soldiers).

At present the RFMF retains a strong internal focus, to the point of armed intervention in domestic security matters. The concerns with regard to its Fijian military professionalism are two-fold:

• will it continue to retain an active, if not dominant position in any future civilian government, and if so, in what way?
• what will be the effect of prolonged involvement in government on the RFDF fighting capability?

Bilateral military-to-military ties with the PRC are a potential avenue for reconciling the two concerns because the Chinese model of civil-military relations presumes a dominant role for the military in conjunction with a strong party and allied state bureaucracy. A future military-backed civilian party that was led by a retired military officer and supported by the military “colonists” within the state bureaucracy would, if elected on open and competitive grounds, be eligible for resumed international security duties, thereby restoring its combat orientation and edge. Even so, difficulties in agreeing to a framework for the holding of elections and international opposition to military involvement in a post-2014 government make the transition to a so-called “professional revolutionary” typology of military institutionalism problematic (but not impossible).

The Papuan New Guinea Defence Forces (PNGDF) are a classic example of military praetorianism. Larger conflicts in civil and political society are played out within the officer  and non-commissioned officer corps.  This has impinged on corporate autonomy, standards of training and operational readiness. Army-dominant and formally organized around the concept of external defense, in practice the PNGDF has since independence been largely dedicated to internal security functions, including counter-insurgency operations such as those against Bougainville secessionists in the early 1990s that resulted in numerous human rights violations and atrocities against civilians and which precipitated the infamous “Sandline Affair” where private mercenaries attempted to put down the insurrection after PNGDF failures, only to be ordered out of the country by the government of the day.

Although in comparative terms, relative to other branches of the PNG state, the PNGDF is considered to be moderately stable, internal factionalization, low levels of recruitment and retention, budgetary constraints and limited professional training and education opportunities have impeded the professional development and orientation of the armed institution as a whole. Australia continues to provide training and education liaison services for PNG defense personnel and PNG military officers have begun to participate in limited military outreach programs offered by the PRC. Even so, ongoing political crises and simmering social tensions reverberate within the military institution to the point that it remains an open question as to its reliability as a cohesive combat organization.

Tonga represents a novelty in that it is undergoing the transition from a praetorian to a new professional military. Traditionally inward-oriented and at the service of the King (something seen in its deployment during the Nuku’alofa riots in 2006), the Tongan Defence Services (TDS) have during the last decade participated in international security operations, most notably as part of Operation Iraqi Freedom (2004-2008) and the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) mission in Afghanistan (2011-present). Since 2002 TDS personnel have also participated in the RAMSI peace-keeping and enforcement mission in the Solomon Islands. With a very small complement of 500 soldiers, this means that the majority of uniformed personnel have overseas combat and peace-keeping experience, making them arguably the most field tested of all of the current PIC militaries. Tonga has defense cooperation agreements with Australia, New Zealand, the US, the UK, and more recently India and China. In 2011 the PRC and Tonga signed a military aid grant agreement by which the PRC would transfer several million dollars worth of non-lethal military equipment to Tonga free of charge. Tongan military officers attend training and educational exchange programs with all of these defense partners, and exercise regularly with Australian, US and New Zealand defense forces in search and rescue (SAR) and humanitarian assistance operations.

Exposure to combat operations with larger professional military forces such as those of the US and the UK are considered to be a significant step towards the corporate professionalization of the TDS as well as an impediment to its involvement in domestic politics short of a national emergency.  In fact, the orientation of the TDS towards traditional military professionalism and foreign field experience is consonant with the gradual liberalization of the Tongan political system under King (George) Tupou V and expected to continue under King  (Aho’eitu) Tupou VI. This places the TDS in stark contrast to the Fijian and Papua New Guinea defense forces, both of which are deeply embroiled in domestic politics that some believe impacts negatively on their operational readiness, corporate cohesion and command discipline.

Analysis: Geopolitics and strategic balancing in the South China Sea.

China has been asserting its territorial claims very aggressively and the United States and associated South East Asian countries have responded.

Most recently China and the Philippines have clashed over the Scarborough Shoal, which itself follows on long-standing arguments about the Spratley Islands (which are also claimed by Vietnam and Malaysia).

In fact, there are six countries with overlapping claims in the South China Sea (Peoples Republic of China (PRC), Viet Nam, Brunei, Malaysia, Philippines, Indonesia).

This has led to what are known as “nested” security games in the region where the larger US-PRC strategic competition (the big game) is the backdrop to the various bilateral and multilateral disputes.

Introduction: As Papua New Guinea struggles to maintain order in the face of two clashing political factions, its two southern neighbors Australia and New Zealand are compelled to tread a soft diplomatic line rather than risk destroying progressive rapprochement with a possible new political order.

Concerns that civil unrest may flare inside Papua New Guinea have intensified in the past two months as lines of division within PNG’s legislature, judiciary, and security apparatus worsen. New Zealand’s High Commission in Papua New Guinea is monitoring political developments and the security situation in PNG closely.

For more, See: 36th-Parallel.com Analysis – The Papua New Guinea Crisis — Australia and New Zealand’s Challenge

36th-Parallel.com’s Dr Paul Buchanan presents the week’s analysis round-up, highlighting top items for the week beginning April 30 to May 6 2012 – including: Chile’s Pacific Naval Presence, and, Is Papua New Guinea A Failing State?

See Also:

• Weekly Analysis: Chile’s Pacific Presence.
• Weekly Analysis: Is Papua New Guinea A Failing State?

APEC Statement Issued by the APEC Committee on Trade and Investment

Singapore, 28 March 2012 – APEC is taking further steps to enhance supply chain performance, improve collaboration on innovation and extend opportunities for more robust economic growth and prosperity in the Asia-Pacific.

That is the aim of a diverse cluster of high-level APEC trade and investment roundtables and workshops taking place this week in Singapore.

Attention will center on delivering practical strategies and solutions necessary to achieve trade and investment liberalization, regional economic integration, innovative growth and supply chain connectivity, which are among APEC’s top 2012 agenda items.

Officials from APEC’s 21 member economies, the private sector, multilateral institutions and a host of other experts will assemble to drive the week-long exchange.

“Trade and policy issues to be addressed include contributions to the multilateral trading system, next generation trade and investment issues, ongoing work to address supply chain bottlenecks, environmental goods and services, private sector engagement and industry dialogues,” said Monica Contreras, chair of the APEC Committee on Trade and Investment.

“Working dialogues will break-down APEC’s key trade issues for 2012, focusing on specific developments and opportunities, and offering relevant inputs,” she added.

A two-day conference on innovation and trade will pinpoint policy prescriptions for how APEC member economies can enable innovative goods, services and business models to flourish and drive productivity and economic growth, with timely input from senior business executives and innovators.

A separate two-day supply chain connectivity symposium will examine the design of a new self-assessment survey and external indicators intended to gauge APEC economies’ progress on supply chain performance, with a further comparative look at international benchmarking methods.

Other programs for the week range from a chemical dialogue with the region’s regulators to a remanufactured goods workshop.

The proceedings will be reviewed by APEC’s Committee on Trade and Investment on 2-3 April in Singapore.

For More:
- 36th Parallel – Regional Economic Resource (Level-B access).
- Outlink – Apec.org.

Eye on the World 36th-Parallel’s Paul Buchanan is interviewed by KiwiFM’s Glenn Williams over China’s expansion and influence in the wider Pacific and how lax communications and loose talk between New Zealand’s National Party Member of Parliament John Hayes and New Zealand Foreign Affairs Minister Murray McCully will impact on China/New Zealand relations.